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CARBON LEAKAGE IN THE EU IN THE LIGHT OF THE 
PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT
Melita Carević*
Summary: Despite the recent adoption of the Paris climate agreement, 
countries taking climate change action are still faced with a poten-
tial risk of carbon leakage due to the absence of a uniform carbon 
price at the global level. This paper analyses the European Union’s 
current and proposed carbon leakage legislation in order to identify 
its strengths and weaknesses. It emphasises that the environmental 
and economic integrity of the European Union’s measures is of cru-
cial importance due to the fact that the European Union’s leadership 
in global climate legislation is highly dependent on it and also since 
the European Union’s legislation has already served and is likely to 
continue serving as a model for similar cap and trade systems world-
wide. The paper concludes that the current regulation of carbon leak-
age in the European Union leads to the overprotection of sectors which 
are considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage 
and that further revisions of the system are necessary.
1 Introduction
At the time of finalising this paper, the 21st Conference of the Parties 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris 
(hereinafter: COP 21) has resulted in a historic breakthrough in climate 
change negotiations – an agreement applicable to all parties, requiring 
them to take action with the aim of ‘holding the increase in the global av-
erage temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and […] 
pursu[ing] efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels’.1 However, since the implementation of the Paris Agree-
ment is scheduled to start from 2020, countries undertaking greenhouse 
gas emission reduction measures prior to 2020 will still be faced with 
a potential risk of carbon leakage. That risk is likely to remain present 
even after 2020, due to the fact that no uniform carbon price will be set 
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1 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, Article 2 <http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf > accessed 12 December 2015.
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at the global level. The environmental and economic integrity of climate 
change mitigation measures taken by early actors, such as the European 
Union, therefore depends on the ability of those measures to cope with 
the issue of carbon leakage. Given the fact that the European Union is 
one of the few members of the international community that has a set 
greenhouse gas emission reduction target under the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (hereinafter: Kyoto Protocol), the European Union will 
continue facing a potential risk of carbon leakage at least until the end 
of 2020.
The aim of the present paper is to analyse carbon leakage mitigation 
measures which are currently in force in the European Union, as well 
as the European Commission’s recent proposal for the revision of those 
measures, and to examine how those measures fit into the European Un-
ion’s long-term goal of being a global leader in the fight against climate 
change. The underlying assumption of the research is that, in order to 
be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter: UNFCCC), the 
European Union’s carbon leakage mitigation measures must genuinely 
contribute to the economic and environmental integrity of the Union’s 
climate change policy and that they must not lead to the overprotection 
of certain carbon intensive sectors. The latter result would be liable to 
seriously endanger the Union’s credibility in international climate change 
politics which would not be beneficial to the Union’s ability to provide 
leadership during the UNFCCC negotiations. Despite the fact that a long 
awaited crucial step has been taken in Paris by the adoption of a new cli-
mate change agreement, the challenging task of its implementation still 
lies ahead and will require strong leadership in order to ensure the ef-
fectiveness of the agreement. It is therefore important that the European 
Union, together with other major economies and greenhouse gas emit-
ters, such as the USA, continues to push for ambitious climate change 
action and thereby enjoys the confidence of the international community. 
Last, as the European Union’s climate change legislation, including pro-
visions on carbon leakage, have already served and are likely to serve as 
a model for climate change regulation worldwide, its efficiency plays an 
important role in global climate change mitigation.
This paper shall first examine how the issue of carbon leakage is 
addressed in the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (hereinaf-
ter: EU ETS), the Union’s main instrument for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from stationary sources. The analysis will focus on the current 
legislative solutions contained in Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Coun-
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cil Directive 96/61/EC (hereinafter: EU ETS Directive).2 Attention shall 
also be paid to the European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/
EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon invest-
ments (hereinafter: Commission’s EU ETS amendment proposal from 
2015)3 which was issued in July 2015. The research will aim to identify 
the main strengths and weaknesses of the current legislative solutions. 
The conclusions of the analysis will be used to examine the legitimacy of 
the Union’s carbon leakage mitigation.
2 Defining carbon leakage
For the purposes of this paper, carbon leakage can be defined as an 
increase in greenhouse gas emissions which takes place as a result of 
climate change regulation outside the area subject to such regulation. 
The notion itself was coined by Felder and Rutherford in 19934 and has 
been defined by several authors in a more or less similar fashion. The 
Fourth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change from 
2007 defines carbon leakage as: ‘the increase in CO2 emissions outside 
the countries taking domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction 
in the emissions of these countries’.5 An OECD/IEA definition, coined by 
Reinaud, follows the same logic: 
Carbon leakage can be defined as the ratio of emissions increase 
from a specific sector outside the country (as a result of a policy 
affecting that sector in the country) over the emission reductions 
in the sector (again, as a result of the environmental policy). 
When handling this issue, the aim is to address environmental 
effectiveness, not industrial policy.6 
2 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amend-
ing Council Directive 96/61/EC (consolidated text as amended by Directive 2004/101/
EC, Directive 2008/101/EC, Regulation No 219/2009, Directive 2009/29/EC, Decision No 
1359/2013/EU and the Treaty of Accession of Croatia, Regulation 421/2014).  
3 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-
carbon investments’ COM (2015) 337 final, 2015/148 (COD). 
4 Guy Meunier and Jean-Pierre Ponnsard, ‘Capacity Decisions with Demand Fluctuations 
and Carbon Leakage’ (2014) 36 Resource and Energy Economics 436, 437, citing S Felder 
and T Rutherford, ‘Unilateral CO2 Reductions and Carbon Leakage: The Consequences of 
International Trade in Oil and Basic Materials’ (1993) 25(2) Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management 162. 
5 IPCC, Climate Change 2007, Mitigation of Climate Change, 665 <http://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4_wg3_full_report.pdf > accessed 2 November 2015.
6 Julia Reinaud, ‘Issues Behind Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage: Focus on Heavy 
Industry’ IEA Information paper, OECD/IEA (2008) 3 <http://www.ictsd.org/down-
loads/2008/11/iea-paper-on-issues-behind-competitiveness_and_carbon_leakage.pdf > 
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Similarly, carbon leakage was also defined as ‘the additional CO2 
emissions of non-mitigating participants (ie subjected to a weak reference 
policy) compared to the CO2 abatement achieved by pioneering regions (ie 
pursuing additional policy ambition)’,7 and as a ‘partial offset of domesti-
cally reduced GHG emissions in countries with less stringent environ-
mental requirements and is hence a measure of reduced environmental 
effectiveness’.8 It has also been defined more simply as ‘the increase in 
emissions outside a country that are directly attributable to the introduc-
tion of climate regulations introduced in that country’.9
A common element in all the aforementioned definitions is the fact 
that carbon leakage occurs as the result of asymmetrical climate change 
policies10 in different regulatory areas, such as states or regions.11 In oth-
er words, carbon leakage can be considered as an inevitable consequence 
of the lack of a global-wide carbon reduction policy regulated by an inter-
national agreement which is binding on the majority of the members of 
the international community, or at least on major emitters of greenhouse 
gasses.12 Carbon leakage, interconnected with the principle of ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities’, therefore undoubtedly represents the 
most controversial issue of the contemporary global climate change gov-
ernance. It raises high levels of concern related both to environmental 
and economic aspects. 
From the environmental point of view, carbon leakage compromises 
the environmental integrity of the greenhouse gas reduction measures 
accessed 2 November 2015.
7 Tabaré Arroyo-Currás and others, ‘Carbon Leakage in a Fragmented Climate Regime: 
The Dynamic Response of Global Energy Markets’ (2015) 90 Technological Forecasting & 
Social Change 192, 192. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.10.002> accessed 2 
November 2015.
8 Birgit Bednar-Friedl, Thomas Schinko and Karl W Steininger, ‘The Relevance of Process 
Emissions for Carbon Leakage: A Comparison of Unilateral Climate Policy Options With and 
Without Border Carbon Adjustment’ (2012) 34 Energy Economics 5168, 5168. Similarly in 
Meunier and Ponnsard (n 4) 436 
9 Robyn Eckersley, ‘The Politics of Carbon Leakage and the Fairness of Border Measures’ 
(2010) 24(4) Ethics & International Affairs 367, 370. 
10 For the definition of asymmetrical climate change policies, see Andrei Marcu and others, 
‘Carbon Leakage: Options for the EU’ CEPS Special Report of 11 March 2014, 2 <http://
www.ceps.eu/book/carbon-leakage-options-eu> accessed 2 November 2015.
11 Certain authors suggest that domestic increases of greenhouse gas emissions in non-
regulated sectors, which take place due to the regulation of other sectors, should also be 
encompassed by the definition of carbon leakage. Elisa Lanzi and others ‘Addressing Com-
petitiveness and Carbon Leakage Impacts Arising from Multiple Carbon Markets: A Mod-
elling Assessment’ (2013) OECD Environment Working Papers No 58, OECD Publishing, 
14 <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k40ggjj7z8v.pdf?expires=141011
0347&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=AFD2AE5856A256044F5A71280C93B21D> ac-
cessed 2 November 2015.
12 Similarly in Arroyo-Currás and others (n 7) 192; Onno Kuik, and Marjan Hofkes, ‘Border 
Adjustment for European Emissions Trading: Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage’ (2010) 
38(4) Energy Policy 1741, 1741.
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adopted by a certain state or region. Since climate change is a global 
problem, due to the fact that greenhouse gasses mix in the atmosphere 
and contribute to global warming regardless of the area from which they 
are emitted, only a global solution can deal with the problem efficiently. 
The reductions of greenhouse gases emitted by a state which regulates 
greenhouse gas emissions will not produce satisfactory results if, be-
cause of that regulation, greenhouse gas emissions shift to another state 
with less stringent or no similar regulation (so called ‘carbon havens’),13 
since the total level of emitted greenhouse gasses will remain the same, 
or potentially even increase. Therefore, from the environmental perspec-
tive, a measure which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions can only 
be effective if it does not at the same time induce carbon leakage which 
results in the increase of emissions elsewhere. In this regard, for the 
environmental integrity of the country’s emission reduction targets, it is 
equally problematic if the increase of emissions takes place as a result 
of the reallocation of the production itself from the regulating country, 
or if it takes place in the form of higher volumes of imported products 
with a high carbon content, which have been produced without the inter-
nalisation of carbon cost. From the environmental perspective, the latter 
example of ‘stowaway carbon’14 should therefore also be taken into ac-
count when assessing the level of emission reductions, for which Eckers-
ley suggests the following formula: ‘The final carbon consumption in any 
given country equals the amount of carbon produced domestically minus 
the embodied carbon in exports plus the embodied carbon in imports’.15 
Such a method of calculating greenhouse gas emission attributable to 
a certain state therefore takes note of the increase of emissions outside 
that state which is directly attributable to its climate change regulation, 
as well as to the increase in emissions which is attributable to global 
trade patterns not necessarily related to climate regulation, since it is in 
practice difficult to distinguish the two. Otherwise, the achievement of 
emission reduction goals by the states taking reduction measures cannot 
be considered genuine and to be leading to the overall reduction of emis-
sions at the global level.16  
On the other hand, from the economic point of view, carbon leakage 
is observed through the spectrum of economic consequences it produces 
13 Eckersley (n 9) 369; Neil Peretz, ‘Carbon Leakage Under the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme: Is It a Major Policy Concern?’ (2009) 23 Tulane Environmental Law Jour-
nal 57, 83. However, it should be noted that unlike other types of pollution havens, carbon 
havens do not represent an imminent threat to the area where they are concentrated, but, 
instead, due to the nature of carbon ‘pollution’, represent a global climate risk. This results 
in a freeriding incentive, since states that do not enact climate change mitigation measures 
do not necessarily suffer the gravest environmental consequences for their inaction. 
14 Eckersley (n 9) 370.
15 ibid.
16 Similarly in Yassen Spassov, ‘EU ETS: Upholding the Carbon Price without Incidence of 
Carbon Leakage’ (2012) 24(2) Journal of Environmental Law 311, 316.
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on the territory of the state or region which implements greenhouse gas 
reduction measures. States or regions which regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions oblige greenhouse gas emitters to internalise the cost of those 
emissions, which would otherwise be considered an externality and not 
accounted for in their production costs. Consequently, since the cost of 
carbon is included in the production costs of economic subjects on the 
territory of a state with greenhouse gas emissions regulation, in undis-
turbed market conditions their products are less competitive than sub-
stitutable products coming from states with no greenhouse gas regula-
tion. The economic and environmental aspects of carbon leakage can 
both nicely be seen in the definition formulated by Meltzer: ‘Carbon leak-
age arises when a carbon price leads domestic businesses to relocate to 
countries not pricing carbon or to increased imports of goods from coun-
tries not pricing carbon, resulting in no net reduction of global CO2 emis-
sions’.17 However, it must be noted that the environmental and economic 
aspects of carbon leakage do not necessarily go hand in hand with one 
another. From the economic aspect, it is important to prevent the shift 
of production from a state which regulates greenhouse gas emissions, 
while from the environmental point of view it is important to achieve a net 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, regardless of whether it leads to 
reallocation of production.18 
3 Current legislative solutions in the European Union 
The EU ETS Directive contains several provisions dealing with the 
issue of carbon leakage.19 It defines the sectors which are deemed to be at 
‘significant risk of carbon leakage’ and foresees several types of measures 
for the mitigation of such risk. The provisions of the EU ETS Directive 
dealing with the issue of carbon leakage will now be analysed in detail, in 
order for their main strengths and weaknesses to be identified.
3.1 Identifying sectors at ‘significant risk of carbon leakage’
The criteria for assessing carbon leakage risk and measures for the 
mitigation of that risk were first introduced into the EU ETS Directive 
by the 2009 amendments contained in Directive 2009/29/EC,20 which 
brought significant changes to the allocation of allowances enacted for 
the third period of the EU ETS, running from 2013 until 2020. The EU 
17 Joshua Meltzer, ‘Climate Change and Trade: The EU Aviation Directive and the WTO’ 
(2012) 13(1) Journal of International Economic Law 111, 111.
18 Eckersley (n 9) 370.
19 The explanation of the notion of carbon leakage can be found in recital 24 of the Direc-
tive’s amendment of 2009.
20 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading scheme of the Community [2009] OJ L140/63.
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ETS Directive from 2003 did not contain any mention of carbon leakage, 
which can be explained by the fact that emission allowances were all al-
located for free during the test period of the EU ETS,21 running from 2005 
until 2007, and that the during the second trading period, running from 
2008 until 2012, the majority of the allowances were also allocated free 
of charge, and only an insignificant number of them auctioned.22 In other 
words, since greenhouse gas emissions did not represent a significant 
production cost during the first two trading periods and since a lower 
number of industry sectors were covered by the scheme, there was no 
need to account for carbon leakage in the EU ETS Directive. However, 
the 2009 amendments introduced auctioning on a much wider scale. 
According to an approximation made by the European Commission’s DG 
Climate Action, ‘over 40% of allowances were auctioned’ in 2013,23 which, 
even though free allocation remained the dominant method of allowance 
distribution, represented a significant step when compared to the previ-
ous commitment periods. Consequently, as the EU ETS became more 
stringent, the risk of carbon leakage increased and the provisions for its 
mitigation were included in the Directive. The level of auctioned allow-
ances is scheduled to further decrease by 1.74% annually until 2020, 
and by 2.2% annually from 2021 until 2030.
The EU ETS Directive envisages quantitative and qualitative criteria 
for assessing the carbon leakage risk. 
Pursuant to Article 10(a), paragraphs 15 and 16 of the consolidated 
text of the Directive, the quantitative criteria for assessing the risk of car-
bon leakage are the following: 
15. A sector or subsector shall be deemed to be exposed to a sig-
nificant risk of carbon leakage if: 
(a) the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by 
the implementation of this Directive would lead to a substantial 
increase of production costs, calculated as a proportion of the 
gross value added, of at least 5%; and 
(b) the intensity of trade with third countries, defined as the ratio 
between the total value of exports to third countries plus the value 
21 Article 10 of the 2003 EU ETS Directive prescribed that at least 95% of allowances are to 
be allocated for free during the first phase of the EU ETS.
22 European Commission, DG Climate Action, EU ETS 2005-2012, <http://ec.europa.eu/
clima/policies/ets/pre2013/index_en.htm> accessed 2 November 2015. Article 10 of the 
2003 EU ETS Directive prescribed that at least 90% of allowances are to be allocated for 
free during the second phase of the EU ETS. However, only some Member States decided to 
make use of the auctioning option. A Denny Ellerman, Frank J Convery, and Christian de 
Perthuis, Pricing Carbon: The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (CUP 2010) 62.
23 DG Climate Action, Auctioning <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auction-
ing/index_en.htm> accessed 2 November 2015.
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of imports from third countries and the total market size for the 
Community (annual turnover plus total imports from third coun-
tries), is above 10%. 
16. Notwithstanding paragraph 15, a sector or subsector is also 
deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage if: 
(a) the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by the 
implementation of this Directive would lead to a particularly high 
increase of production costs, calculated as a proportion of the 
gross value added, of at least 30%; or 
(b) the intensity of trade with third countries, defined as the ratio 
between the total value of exports to third countries plus the val-
ue of imports from third countries and the total market size for 
the Community (annual turnover plus total imports from third 
countries), is above 30%.
The EU ETS Directive therefore prescribes two separate sets of quan-
titative criteria for determining whether a specific sector is subject to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage. Paragraph 15 lays down two conditions 
that have to be fulfilled cumulatively, but which are therefore less strin-
gent. The criteria which are deemed to expose a sector to risk of carbon 
leakage are direct costs of complying with the requirements of the EU 
ETS, that is, the carbon costs incurred during production, indirect costs 
that arise due to the increase in energy prices, the intensity of trade with 
third countries, and market share. On the other hand, paragraph 16 
prescribes two alternative criteria with a higher threshold, which are ap-
plicable to sectors which either suffer a high direct or indirect cost due to 
the application of the EU ETS, or are significantly exposed to trade with 
third countries, which renders their market position vulnerable to foreign 
competition.  
These quantitative criteria are furthermore supplemented by quali-
tative criteria which are prescribed by Article 10(a)17:
The list referred to in paragraph 13 may be supplemented af-
ter completion of a qualitative assessment, taking into account, 
where the relevant data are available, the following criteria:
(a) the extent to which it is possible for individual installations 
in the sector or subsector concerned to reduce emission levels or 
electricity consumption, including, as appropriate, the increase 
in production costs that the related investment may entail, for 
instance on the basis of the most efficient techniques;
(b) current and projected market characteristics, including when 
trade exposure or direct and indirect cost increase rates are close 
to one of the thresholds mentioned in paragraph 16;
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(c) profit margins as a potential indicator of long-run investment 
or relocation decisions.
The main purpose of the qualitative criteria is to ensure that the 
stringency of the quantitative criteria are addressed and to make sure 
that the sectors that do not satisfy the quantitative thresholds are not, 
due to their specificities, unjustifiably left out of the list, or that some 
sectors which have been put on the list are removed from it. However, 
the qualitative criteria have so far been used just for the inclusion of ad-
ditional sectors to the list, and not for the assessment of whether some 
sectors have unjustifiably been put on the list.24 Due to time constrains, 
in 2009, for the purposes of composing the first carbon leakage list for 
the period 2013-2014, only the sectors which bordered with the quanti-
tative thresholds and some specific sectors were examined on the basis 
of qualitative criteria,25 and five sectors were identified as exposed to sig-
nificant risk of carbon leakage and added to the list.26 In 2014, for the 
purposes of composing the second carbon leakage list for the period run-
ning from 2015 until 2019, six sectors were added to the list on the basis 
of qualitative criteria from Article 10(a)17.27
The final factor which should be taken into account when determin-
ing the sectors which are exposed to significant risk of carbon leakage is 
whether the commitment of third countries, which represent an important 
share of global production in a given sector, to greenhouse gas emission 
reductions and the carbon efficiency of their installations are comparable 
to those of the Union.28 This factor is very important because comparable 
climate mitigation action of major trading partners minimises or even 
eliminates the need to protect a given sector from carbon leakage. How-
ever, it seems that the wording of Article 10(a)18 of the EU ETS Directive 
only requires that third countries are firmly committed to reducing their 
greenhouse gas emissions, and does not go so far as to require that they 
actually achieve those reductions in practice. This wording can perhaps 
24 Susanne Dröge and Simone Cooper, ‘Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon 
Prices: A Study for the Greens/EFA Group’ (May 2010) Climate Strategies 27.
25 Draft Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Doc-
ument to the Commission Decision determining a list of sectors and subsectors which are 
deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage pursuant to Article 10a (13) of 
Directive 2003/87/EC, C(2009)10251 final, 18 <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/
cap/leakage/docs/sec_2009_1710_en.pdf > accessed 2 November 2015.
26 According to the data provided by an official of DG Climate Action. H Bergman, ‘Sectors 
Deemed To Be Exposed to a Significant Risk Of Carbon Leakage: Outcome of the Assess-
ment, WG 3 Meeting 18 September 2009’ 9 <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/
leakage/docs/wg3_16_sep_presentation_en.pdf > accessed 2 November 2015.
27 Commission Decision of 27 October 2014 determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which 
are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, for the period 2015 to 2019 
(2014/746/EU) 124. 
28 Article 10(a)18 of the EU ETS Directive.
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be explained by the difficulty of measuring actual greenhouse gas emis-
sions which are attributable to a certain policy instrument. However, in 
the current form it does not ensure the environmental effectiveness of the 
EU’s greenhouse gas reduction measures, but only prevents economic 
leakage, since it presumably requires that a comparable carbon price is 
put on emissions in third countries. 
While determining the list of sectors which are considered to be ex-
posed to significant risk of carbon leakage in the 2015-2019 period, the 
Commission undertook the aforementioned analysis and concluded that 
no comparable action was being taken by third countries and therefore 
considered this criterion to be irrelevant for the determination of the list.29 
However, the Commission will have a more demanding task of assess-
ing climate change mitigation efforts of its trading partners when draft-
ing the third carbon leakage list for the post 2019 period, as more and 
more countries are introducing different forms of greenhouse gas reduc-
tion measures. For example, in January 2015 South Korea introduced 
a cap and trade system modelled after the EU ETS.30 The production of 
steel, which South Korea exports into the EU among other countries, and 
which is considered to be exposed to significant risk of carbon leakage in 
the EU, is covered by the scheme.31 Furthermore, several regional pilot 
cap and trade systems have been put in place in one of the Union’s main 
trading partners, China, and a national cap and trade system has been 
announced for 2017.32 The USA has also stepped up its greenhouse gas 
emission reductions by adopting the Carbon Pollution Standards for Ex-
isting Power Plants in August 2015, and by putting in place regional cap 
and trade systems.33 Depending on the success of third-country meas-
ures and their trade with the EU in the relevant sectors, it is not unlikely 
that the Commission will have to perform the above-mentioned analysis 
in the near future for the purposes of amending the current carbon leak-
age list. While assessing the comparability of third-country action, the 
29 Commission Decision of 27 October 2014 determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which 
are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, for the period 2015 to 2019 
(2014/746/EU), recital 3.
30 Reuters, ‘South Korea Launches World’s Second-Biggest Carbon Market’ (12 January 2015) 
<http://in.reuters.com/article/southkorea-carbontrading-idINKBN0KL05K20150112> ac-
cessed 2 December 2015.
31 International Carbon Action Partnership, Korea Emissions Trading Scheme, 2 <https://
icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com_etsmap&task=export&format=pdf&layout=list&sy
stems%5B%5D=47> accessed 2 December 2015.
32 Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Coral Davenport, ‘China to Announce Cap-and-Trade Pro-
gram to Limit Emissions’, New York Times (New York, 24 September 2015) <http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-president-obama-summit.html?_
r=0> accessed 2 December 2015.
33 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Q&A: EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Existing Power Plants <http://www.c2es.org/federal/executive/epa/q-a-
regulation-greenhouse-gases-existing-power> accessed 2 December 2015.
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Commission will have to take into account the fact that the EU ETS has 
been suffering from the over-allocation of emission allowances and a low 
carbon price and that it has so far produced relatively modest results, 
as admitted by the Commission itself.34 In order to be fair towards third 
countries which export carbon leakage sensitive products into the EU, 
the Commission will have to assess the Union’s commitment to reduce 
its greenhouse gas emission in a self-critical manner and in the light of 
the above-mentioned difficulties the EU ETS has been facing. Should a 
country’s commitment to climate change mitigation be assessed only on 
the basis of its policy choices, it could be argued that in the long run all 
countries could be considered as taking comparable action since they 
are parties to the recently adopted Paris Agreement and are taking some 
form of action in accordance with the principle of ‘common but differenti-
ated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different 
national circumstances’. Since one of the criteria for assessing the com-
parability of third-country action is the time frame within which emission 
reductions are taking place, the newly adopted Paris Agreement will not 
be relevant for the period running until 2020. 
On the basis of the aforementioned criteria, and as required by Ar-
ticle 10(a)13 of the EU ETS Directive, the European Commission has 
adopted two decisions which identified the sectors and subsectors ex-
posed to significant risk of carbon leakage.35 The first list, adopted by the 
Commission after a thorough stakeholder consultation process and in 
agreement with the Council and the European Parliament, included 164 
sectors, such as the production of iron, steel, aluminium, paper, pulp, 
cement, lime and others, and in 2009 covered approximately 75% of all 
industrial emissions within the EU ETS,36 which equals approximately 
40% of all emissions covered by the ETS in 2009. Such a high number 
of sectors which were assessed to be at significant risk of carbon leakage 
confirmed concerns whether the criteria for their identification had been 
properly framed.37 
34 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-
carbon investments COM (2015) 337 final, 2015/148 (COD) 5, 13.
35 The first decision was applicable to the 2013-2014 period: Commission Decision of 24 
December 2009 determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed 
to significant risk of carbon leakage [2010] OJ L1/10. The list of sectors exposed to the 
significant risk of carbon leakage has so far been amended several times, by Commission 
Decisions 11/11/2011 - 2011/745/EU, 17/08/2012 - C (2012) 5715 and 18/12/2013 - C 
(2013) 9186. The second decision applies to the 2015-2019 period – Commission Decision 
of 27 October 2014 determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed 
to a significant risk of carbon leakage, for the period 2015 to 2019 (2014/746/EU).
36 According to the data provided by an official of DG Climate Action. See Bergman (n 26).
37 For a summary of methodological flaws of the carbon leakage list, see Dröge and Cooper 
(n 24) 25-28.
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According to an analysis made by Clò,38 out of 140 sectors which 
were in 2009 considered to be exposed to significant risk of carbon leak-
age based on the quantitative criteria, 134 have entered the list mainly 
because of their high trade exposure, regardless of their carbon inten-
sity.39 Eighty-three of those sectors were liable for a cost increase lower 
than 1%. Out of the listed 140 sectors, only 6 satisfied the cumulative 
criteria from Article 10(a)15, which ensures that a sector faces a higher 
cost increase, meaning that it is carbon intensive, and is significantly 
trade exposed.40 Consequently, that criterion is the only one suitable for 
identifying the sectors at risk.41 Clò therefore concludes that the criteria 
for determining the sectors at risk are not sufficiently grounded and have 
been set as a political compromise.42 This conclusion is supported by the 
fact that the Article 10(a)16 criterion which the majority of sectors met 
and thereby had entered the list, requires only trade exposure of 30% or 
higher, regardless of the impact of the EU ETS on that sector, or a cost 
increase of 30% or higher, regardless of whether or not that cost can be 
passed on to consumers and whether or not the sector is exposed to in-
ternational trade.43 Even though Article 10(a)14 of the EU ETS Directive 
states that in order to determine the sectors which are exposed to a sig-
nificant risk of carbon leakage, the Commission shall assess the ability 
of sectors to ‘pass on the direct cost of the required allowance and the 
indirect costs from higher electricity prices resulting from the implemen-
tation of this Directive into product prices without significant loss of mar-
ket share to less carbon efficient installations outside the Community’, 
the determination of a cost pass-through rate bares no relation to the 
first alternative criterion of Article 10(a)16. The ability of a market opera-
tor to pass through its direct and indirect costs to consumers depends on 
the structure of the market and the level of competition in it, the elasticity 
of demand and exposure to international trade.44 
The extent to which the list includes a too broad number of sectors 
can perhaps best be illustrated by listing some of the sectors which are 
38 Stefano Clò, ‘Grandfathering, Auctioning and Carbon Leakage: Assessing the Inconsist-
encies of the New ETS Directive’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 2420, 2426. 
39 The same conclusion about the inadequacy of the criterion was reached in Sean Healy 
and Katja Schumacher, ‘Support to the Commission for the Determination of the List of 
Sectors and Subsectors Deemed to Be Exposed to a Significant Risk of Carbon Leakage 
for the Years 2015-2019 (EU Emission Trading System)’ (2013) Literature Review, Öko-
Institut eV and Ecofys 10 <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/leakage/docs/
carbon_leakage_list_en.pdf > accessed 13 November 2015.
40 Clò (n 38) 2426. Slightly different data in Dröge and Cooper (n 24) 26.
41 Clò (n 38) 2428. 
42 ibid. The same view has been shared in Stéphanie Monjon and Philippe Quirion, ‘How to 
Design a Border Adjustment for the European Union Emissions Trading System?’ (2010) 38 
Energy Policy 5199, 5203.
43 Clò (n 38) 2427. 
44 Healy and Schumacher (n 39) 11. 
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considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage: manufac-
ture of brooms and brushes (cost increase <5%, trade intensity 43.3%), 
manufacture of carpets and rugs (cost increase 0.8%, trade intensity 
31.2%) and building and repairing of pleasure and sporting boats (cost 
increase 0.3%, trade intensity 62%).45 Further concerns are raised by the 
fact that the assessments about the future cost increases  for the 2013-
2014 list, which was composed in 2009, were based on the assumption 
that the EU ETS allowance price would remain at around €30,46 a level 
which it only briefly reached in 2006 and which it only approached at the 
end on 2008. Given that the actual allowance price in 2013 and 2014 
varied between €3 and €6, the number of sectors which are in practice 
exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage is much lower. However, 
for the purposes of determining the new list of sectors and subsectors at 
risk for the 2015-2019 period, the Commission proposed to use the same 
price assumption of €30.47 In its explanation, the Commission acknowl-
edged the discrepancy between the projected price which was used as 
the calculation basis for the first list in 2009 and actual prices. It justi-
fied its proposal to use the same €30 price assumption by the fact that 
a 40% emission reduction target had been proposed for 2030 and by its 
proposal for a market stability reserve, because the Commission expected 
that the market stability reserve, once adopted, would raise the allow-
ance prices in the future.48 The Commission’s proposal of the new car-
bon leakage list was accepted by the European Parliament Environment 
Committee in September 2014 and, after being approved by the Council, 
finally adopted by the Commission in October 2014.49 Notwithstanding 
possible market developments, it seems rather unlikely that the prices 
of EU ETS allowances will increase up to €30 per allowance, at least not 
during the first few years of the relevant period. The main reason why 
such an increase seems highly improbable is the fact that in summer 
2014 the EU ETS market suffered from 213 million surplus allowances. 
The backloading decision, adopted by the Commission, might remedy the 
45 Overview of NACE-4 level carbon leakage assessments (‘present assessment’ as sent to 
the Climate Change Committee on 5 May 2014) <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/
cap/leakage/docs/carbon_leakage_comparison_en.pdf > accessed 13 November 2015.
46 Draft Commission Staff Working Document (n 25) 5. 
47 Draft of the Commission Decision determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are 
deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, for the period 2015 to 2019, 4 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/leakage/docs/20140502_decision_en.pdf> 
accessed 13 November 2015.
48 ibid. 
49 EurActiv, ‘EU Agrees to €5bn Carbon Permit Giveaway (25 September  2014) <http://
www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/eu-agrees-eu5bn-carbon-permit-giveaway-308702> 
accessed 13 November 2015; European Commission, DG Climate Action, ‘Carbon Leakage’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/leakage/index_en.htm> accessed 1 Decem-
ber 2015. 
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situation partially, but its impact is dubious because it only postpones 
the auctioning of allowances and does not remove them from the mar-
ket. The reasons for the price increase quoted by the Commission came 
in May 2014, when the draft decision on the sectors at risk of carbon 
leakage was published, still only proposals, and the Commission should 
not have been as confident in relying on the ability of those proposals to 
achieve such a strong increase in the carbon price in such a short period. 
The market stability reserve is unlikely to influence the allowance prices 
in the 2015-2019 period for which the list is drafted, because the market 
stability reserve will only become operational on 1 January 2019.50 It is 
therefore disappointing that the Commission did not decide to strengthen 
the EU ETS Directive’s loose criteria for determining the sectors at risk of 
significant carbon leakage, but instead chose a very improbable, but very 
industry-favourable allowance price scenario for the basis of its calcula-
tions. By doing so, the Commission contributed to the higher percentage 
of freely allocated allowances between 2015 and 2019, which runs con-
trary to the EU ETS’s tendency to increase the proportion of auctioning 
of allowances.        
3.2 Current carbon leakage mitigation measures under the EU ETS 
Directive
Due to the described high share of sectors exposed to carbon leak-
age in the overall sectors subject to the EU ETS, the choice of mitigating 
measures is crucial for the efficient functioning of the scheme and the 
achievement of the goals of greenhouse gas emission reduction. The EU 
ETS Directive equips the scheme with three methods for the mitigation of 
carbon leakage from the stationary sectors which are covered by it. The 
only mitigation measure which has so far been put in place in all Mem-
ber States at the Union level is the free allocation of emission allowances 
to the sectors exposed to significant risk of carbon leakage. The second 
measure envisaged by the Directive is financial support to sectors at risk, 
which is decided upon and provided by each Member State individually. 
The third option for addressing carbon leakage envisaged by the Directive 
is the possibility of the introduction of border carbon adjustments. 
3.2.1 Free allocation of allowances
The main mitigation instrument that the EU legislator opted for in 
order to remedy the competitive position of sectors and subsectors which 
are exposed to significant risk of carbon leakage is the free allocation of 
50 Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 
2015 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Un-
ion greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC, Article 
1(1).
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allowances, the number of which is determined on the basis of Union-
wide ex-ante benchmarks.51 The main difference between the free alloca-
tion of allowances to sectors which are at significant risk of carbon leak-
age, when compared to other sectors which also receive allowances for 
free during the third trading period, is the fact that sectors at significant 
risk of carbon leakage are eligible to receive 100% of their allowances for 
free, while the quantity of free allowances to other sectors is declining 
annually, starting with 80% of free allowances in 2013, and ending with 
30% in 2020, while no free allocation for those sectors will be possible 
in 2027.52 However, even though the sectors at significant risk of carbon 
leakage are in theory eligible to receive all of their allowances for free, the 
exact number of free allowances they will actually receive is dependent on 
the extent to which a specific greenhouse gas emitting installation satis-
fies the relevant sector’s benchmark.53 
Benchmarking
Ellerman and Buchner define benchmarking as: ‘A principle of allo-
cation whereby some index of historical activity or capacity is multiplied 
by a usually uniform emission-rate standard to determine allocations to 
individual installations’.54 Benchmarking aims to ensure that two market 
participants which are similar regarding production factors, except emis-
sions, are treated alike and that the undertaking with higher emissions 
does not receive more allowances than the one with lower emissions.55 
The EU ETS benchmarks are product-based and are set on the ba-
sis of ‘the average performance of 10% of most efficient installations in a 
sector or subsector in the Community in the years 2007-2008’.56 By set-
ting the benchmark at the top 10% of the most efficient installations, the 
Union legislator rewarded those installations which took early action for 
reducing their greenhouse gas emissions.57 Benchmarks are set individu-
ally for products from each sector and subsector which has been listed 
as exposed to the significant risk of carbon leakage. Furthermore, bench-
marks are set at the Union level, which ensures that the same stand-
ards for the free allocation of allowances apply in all Member States, 
which minimises the chances of distorted competition and strengthens 
the internal market. The EU ETS Directive provides only for ex-ante 
51 Article 10(a)12 of the consolidated text of the EU ETS Directive. 
52 Article 10(a)11 of the consolidated text of the EU ETS Directive.
53 Article 10(a)12 of the consolidated text of the EU ETS Directive.
54 A Denny Ellerman and Barbara K Buchner, ‘The European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme: Origins, Allocation and Early Results’ (2007) 1(1) Review of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Policy 66, 76.
55 ibid.
56 Article 10(a)2 of the consolidated text of the EU ETS Directive. 
57 Ellerman, Convery and De Perthuis (n 22) 64.
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benchmarks,58 meaning that the benchmarks on the basis of which free 
allowances are allocated are set in advance and take into account the 
historic emissions of an installation, not its future ones. The installa-
tions are therefore allocated a pre-defined quantity of free allowances, 
regardless of how much their future emissions will amount to during the 
relevant commitment period.59 
However, the benchmark-setting process itself has been long and 
burdensome. Due to time constraints, data insufficiencies, differences 
between installations within the sectors and non-existing previous stand-
ards which could serve as benchmarks, timely definitions of benchmarks 
were mostly not available during the first and second commitment pe-
riods, and emission allowances were therefore distributed on the basis 
of the installations’ historic emissions.60 The initial difficulties regarding 
benchmark setting were overcome by 2011 when the Commission pub-
lished the ‘Benchmarking Decision’ which contains the list of applicable 
product benchmarks.61 Concerns have been raised that the benchmark-
setting process resulted in some inefficiencies and needs further improve-
ments.62 The benchmark of the top 10% efficient installations operating in 
the Union has several advantages and disadvantages. Its main advantage 
is that it can be determined relatively easily, while its biggest flaw is that 
it does not necessarily ensure sufficient progress towards carbon efficient 
technologies in cases where the top 10% of installations in the sector are 
still using carbon intense technologies. This problem can more success-
fully be addressed by the best available technology (BAT) benchmark, but 
its determination is often very complex. Fast technological developments 
would require frequent changes of the BAT benchmark, which does not 
provide a sufficient level of certainty for investors. Furthermore, the best 
available technology might often be too expensive for most installations, 
which leads to its practical application as a best available technology not 
entailing excessive cost (BATNEEC) benchmark.63  
Free allocation v auctioning 
The main idea behind the free allocation of allowances to sectors 
at significant risk of carbon leakage is to remedy their competitive posi-
58 Article 10(a)1 of the consolidated text of the EU ETS Directive.
59 The same in Spassov (n 16) 321.
60 Ellerman and Buchner (n 54) 77. In the described scenario in which reliable bench-
marks could not have been set, historic emissions are considered to be a more acceptable 
standard. Ellerman, Convery and De Perthuis (n 22) 65.
61 Commission Decision of 27 April 2011 determining transitional Union-wide rules for 
harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2011] OJ L130/1. 
62 Dirk Böhler, ‘The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Fixing a Broken Promise’ (2013) 15 
Environmental Law Review 95, 99-100; Spassov (n 16) 321.
63 Ellerman, Convery and De Perthuis (n 22) 66.
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tion, which might be threatened by international production not subject 
to comparable internalisation of carbon costs, and thereby to prevent 
carbon leakage.64 It must be emphasised that the fact that sectors at 
significant risk of carbon leakage are eligible to receive 100% of all their 
allowances for free does not amount to the exclusion of those sectors 
from the scope of the EU ETS. Those sectors are still responsible for sur-
rendering the quantity of allowances corresponding to their greenhouse 
gas emissions at the end of the commitment period. Furthermore, the 
sectors at significant risk of carbon leakage are not necessarily allocated 
all of their allowances for free – only those installations which satisfy 
the relevant product benchmarks are. Even then, should those installa-
tions increase their emissions above the estimated level, they will have 
to purchase additional allowances to cover those additional emissions. 
Nevertheless, even though sectors which are at significant risk of carbon 
leakage are not excluded from the EU ETS, they are given an advantage 
in comparison to other sectors covered by the EU ETS, at the expense of 
the final consumers of their products.
Free allocation of emission allowances, often referred to as 
grandfathering,65 has attracted most of the EU ETS related critiques. One 
of the main concerns regarding free allocation which served as the pre-
dominant method of distribution of allowances during the first two trad-
ing periods, and still constitutes the dominant method at the beginning 
of the third trading period, is that it enabled the sectors covered by the 
EU ETS to gain windfall profits.66 Windfall profits occurred at a higher 
scale during the first two trading periods because some of the sectors, 
such as the power sector, to which free allowances were allocated, passed 
their carbon cost to the consumers and thereby earned profits, since 
they did not pay for the allowances in the first place. From the economic 
perspective, this can be explained by the fact that the market value of a 
free allowance represents an opportunity cost to the market operator it 
was allocated to. That market operator has the choice either to reduce 
its emissions and sell the allowance, or to continue with the business-
as-usual production, and use the allowance to cover its emissions. In 
64 Similarly Dröge and Cooper (n 24) 33; Peretz (n 13) 87.
65 Ellerman, Convery and De Perthuis (n 22) 61; Robert C Schmidt and Jobst Heitzig, 
‘Carbon Leakage: Grandfathering As an Inventive Device to Avert Firm Relocation’ (2014) 
67 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 209, 210. The authors define 
grandfathering as: ‘free allocation of permits in proportion to some historical variable (eg, 
emissions) of the firm’. 
66 A Denny Ellerman, Claudio Marcantonini and Aleksandar Zaklan, ‘The EU ETS: Eight 
Years and Counting’ EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2014/04, 3 <http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2383870> accessed 13 November 2015; Ellerman and Buchner (n 54) 73; Peretz (n 
13) 89; Sandbag, ‘Carbon Fat Cats 2011: The Companies Profiting from the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme’ (June 2011) <http://www.sandbag.org.uk/site_media/pdfs/reports/
Sandbag_2011-06_fatcats.pdf> accessed 13 November 2015.  
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the latter case, should the lost profit which could have been made if the 
allowance were sold, in the amount of the difference between the market 
price of the allowance and the cost of emission reduction which the mar-
ket operator undertook, not be retrieved from the consumers, that would 
represent lost profits and would constitute economically inefficient be-
haviour. By passing the cost of the potential profit to the consumers, the 
market operator is taking the price of allowance into account while mak-
ing business decisions. Since carbon intensive products thereby become 
more expensive, consumers are likely to gradually shift towards products 
of lower carbon intensity.67 This analysis shows that the free allocation of 
allowances is capable of producing the same emission reduction effects as 
auctioning.68 The main difference between the two, however, lies in who 
pays for the emission reductions to whom.69 When emission allowances 
are auctioned, the installation which buys the allowance makes payment 
for the allowance to the entity issuing it, mainly the government. If it is 
able to pass that cost to the consumer it will be able to recover that cost, 
which will not be considered as windfall profits. On the other hand, in the 
case of the free allocation of allowances, if the market operator passes the 
cost of the allowance to the consumers, it is the market operator who will 
keep the profits, not the government. Since the market operator did not 
pay for the allowance, those profits will be windfall profits. If the market 
operator is not able to pass the cost to the consumers, no profits will be 
earned. This shows that the free allocation of allowances which leads to 
windfall profits is not in line with the polluter pays principle.70 The 2009 
amendments of the EU ETS Directive addressed concerns about windfall 
profits by expressly excluding the power sector from the sectors eligible 
for the free allocation of allowances.71 The EU power sector, which is re-
sponsible for approximately 50% of EU ETS emissions, is the sector most 
capable of passing the carbon price to consumers, since it does not suffer 
from international competition due to the geographical isolation of the 
EU from potential importers of electricity.72 Given the fact that the power 
67 Clò (n 38) 2422. For a completely opposite view, see Peretz (n 13) 89; K Holzer, Carbon-
related Border Adjustment and WTO Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 48. 
68 Ellerman, Convery and De Perthuis (n 22) 86.
69 Clò (n 38) 2422.
70 Woerdman, Arcuri and Clò conclude that grandfathering is consistent with the so called 
‘weak’ and ‘strong forms of the polluter pays principle, but that it might be problematic from 
the “extended” form of the polluter pays principle, which encompasses the equity perspec-
tive, because polluting firms do not have to purchase the emission rights while their share-
holders become richer’. Edwin Woerdman, Alessandra Arcuri and Stefano Clò, ‘Emissions 
Trading and the Polluter-Pays Principle: Do Polluters Pay under Grandfathering?’(2008) 
4(2) Review of Law and Economics 565, 586; Stefan Weishaar, Towards Auctioning: The 
Transformation of the European Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System: Present and 
Future Challenges to Competition Law (Kluwer Law International 2009) 103. 
71 Article 10(a)1 of the consolidated text of the EU ETS Directive.
72 Ellerman, Marcantonini and Zaklan (n 66) 3.
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sector is in principle not eligible for free allowances, it can be concluded 
that the risk of windfall profits is significantly lower in the third EU ETS 
trading period. However, due to the very broad definition of the sectors 
exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, the possibility of windfall 
profits cannot be excluded. 
Due to the above-mentioned conclusion that the carbon price is in-
ternalised in the business decisions of market operators to which allow-
ances were allocated for free, and that free allocation is therefore equally 
efficient as auctioning, it cannot be claimed that the free allocation of 
allowances increases the pressure for higher levels of carbon abatement 
in the remaining EU ETS sectors. Furthermore, some studies have shown 
that grandfathering can be used as an effective tool to prevent firm real-
locations both in the short and long term.73 In the short term, free allow-
ances annul the carbon cost and therefore eliminate the incentive for firm 
reallocation. In the long run, a carefully designed and gradually phased 
out grandfathering scheme can provide an incentive for investments in 
emission reductions, which can, due to a lock-in effect of invested capi-
tal, render the reallocation inefficient.74
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the free allocation of al-
lowances deprives the state of potential budgetary revenue which could 
be used for climate change mitigation measures. At the same time, the 
fact that the free allocation of allowances does not represent any cost to 
market operators makes it more politically acceptable. As stated by Tiet-
enberg, ‘free distribution of permits (as opposed to auctioning them off) 
seems to be a key ingredient in the successful implementation of emis-
sion trading programs’.75 Apart from alleviating the introduction of a cap 
and trade system, the free allocation of allowances can also reduce the 
resistance of the covered sectors to more stringent emission reduction 
goals.76
3.2.2 Financial measures 
The second instrument which can be used by Member States for the 
prevention of carbon leakage is envisaged in Article 10(a)6 of the EU ETS 
Directive, which prescribes that ‘Member States may also adopt financial 
measures in favour of sectors or subsectors determined to be exposed to 
a significant risk of carbon leakage due to costs relating to greenhouse 
73 Schmidt and Heitzig (n 65) 219.
74 ibid.
75 Bård Harstad and Gunnar S Eskeland, ‘Trading for the Future: Signalling in Permit 
Markets’ (2010) 94 Journal of Public Economics 749, 749, citing T Tietenberg, Emissions 
Trading: Principles and Practice (2nd edn, RFF Press 2006).
76 Schmidt (n 65) 209, citing T Sterner and LH Isaksson, ‘Refunded Emission Payments: A 
Hybrid Instrument with Some Attractive Properties’ (2006) 57 Ecological Economics 93. 
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gas emissions passed on in electricity prices, in order to compensate for 
those costs’. 
The main reason why the EU ETS Directive contains the above-
mentioned provision, which enables financial assistance to sectors which 
are at significant risk of carbon leakage, is to remedy certain distortions 
caused by the fact that the power sector is able to pass the full cost of 
emission allowances to its consumers. This consequently leaves energy-
intensive industries vulnerable to higher electricity prices. Unlike the 
electricity generating sector and due to stronger competition on their mar-
kets, energy intensive industries often cannot pass the increase of their 
production costs to the consumers. The increase of their indirect costs 
cannot be remedied by the free allocation of allowances, since free allow-
ances cover only direct carbon costs, ie only direct emissions from the in-
stallation they were allocated to. However, as stated in Article 10(a)6, not 
all sectors which have been put on the significant carbon leakage risk list 
are eligible to receive financial support, but only those which are energy 
intensive, and which are put on the list due to the increase in their indi-
rect costs. An example of such a sector is the production of aluminium, 
where ‘electricity represents 30% to 40% of the production cost’.77
Even though direct financial support to the above-mentioned sectors 
is capable of alleviating their competitive position, this carbon leakage 
mitigation measure at the same time suffers from too broad an applica-
tion. It is therefore liable to represent an excessive financial burden on 
the Member States which decide to apply it and to cause competitive dis-
tortions, because some Member States might have sufficient resources 
to grant the aid, while others might not.78 Pursuant to Article 10(a)6 of 
the EU ETS Directive, Member States may ‘adopt financial measures in 
favour of sectors or subsectors determined to be exposed to a significant 
risk of carbon leakage due to costs relating to greenhouse gas emissions 
passed on in electricity prices’. Article 10(a)6 therefore refers to Article 
10(a) paragraph 16(a) for the determination of the sectors which are at 
significant risk of carbon leakage, which sets the criteria for the free al-
location of allowances. As analysed above in section 2.1 of this paper. 
Article 10(a) paragraph 16(a) only takes into account whether a 30% or 
higher increase of production costs occurs in a given sector (which, in 
order for Article 10(a) 6 to be applicable, has to derive from increased 
electricity prices), regardless of the fact of whether that sector is capable 
of passing the increased cost of production to the consumers. When other 
77 Peretz (n 13) 66, citing China Aluminium Network, ‘EAA Warns Emissions Trading Could 
Hurt European Aluminium Sector’ <http://www.alu.com.cn/enNews/NewsInfo_2735.
html> accessed 13 November 2015. 
78 Point 8 of the Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on certain State aid 
measures in the context of the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme post-
2012 (2012/C 158/04).
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concerns about the methodology of determining the list of sectors at sig-
nificant risk of carbon leakage are taken into account, special attention 
should be paid to a very narrow application of this mitigation measure. 
Should financial assistance be given to the installations which are capa-
ble of passing their increased production costs to consumers, this could 
lead to windfall profits and to a violation of state aid rules. 
This issue was addressed by the Commission in its 2012 Guidelines 
on state aid in the context of the ETS, where a special definition of carbon 
leakage was adopted for the purpose of the application of the Guidelines. 
According to the Guidelines, carbon leakage: ‘describes the prospect of 
an increase in global greenhouse gas emissions when companies shift 
production outside the Union because they cannot pass on the cost in-
creases induced by the EU ETS to their customers without significant 
loss of market share’.79 The Guidelines therefore narrow the scope of ap-
plication of Article 10(a)6 of the EU ETS Directive in a way that they ex-
clude the companies which can pass the carbon cost to the consumers. 
Furthermore, the Guidelines set the formula for the calculation of the 
maximum amount of aid that can be awarded to a single installation.80 
The maximum intensity of aid is also set, starting at 85% of eligible indi-
rect costs in 2013, and ending with 75% coverage in 2020, which should 
ensure that the installations which the aid is awarded to are not aid de-
pendant and do not lose incentives to switch to power sources of lower 
carbon intensity.81 Annex II to the Guidelines contains the list of all sec-
tors and subsectors deemed ex-ante to be exposed to a significant risk of 
carbon leakage due to indirect emission costs. According to the Guide-
lines, only 15 sectors which are listed in Annex II, such as aluminium 
production and the manufacture of paper and paperboard, are eligible 
to receive financial aid under Article 10(a)6 of the EU ETS Directive. The 
Guidelines therefore significantly narrowed the list of potential sectors 
which could benefit from financial assistance when compared to the po-
tential recipients under the EU ETS Directive. Even though the Guide-
lines are not legally binding on Member States, they should be taken into 
account because they provide indication of whether the Commission is 
likely to consider the aid lawful. However, a problem remains that the Di-
rective does not expressly authorise the Commission to narrow the scope 
of application of Article 10(a)6 by adopting restrictive guidelines, but only 
states that the financial measures must be ’in accordance with state aid 
rules applicable and to be adopted in this area’. 82 According to the case 
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an instrument of soft 
79 ibid, point 7.
80 ibid, point 27.
81 ibid, points 12 and 26.
82 Article 10(a)6 of the consolidated text of the EU ETS Directive. 
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law cannot modify the mandatory rules contained in hard law.83 This 
conclusion is a logical consequence of the legislative procedure in the 
Union. Since consent of the Parliament and the Council is necessary for a 
legislative act to be enacted, it would be contrary to the democratic foun-
dations of the legislative procedure if the Commission could unilaterally 
modify it. The status of the Guidelines therefore remains questionable.     
Current data show that some Member States have decided to make 
use of Article 10(a)6 of the EU ETS Directive and grant financial assis-
tance due to carbon leakage. According to a study made by Marcu and 
others, ‘at least five member states and Norway provide this compensa-
tion (UK, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Belgium (Flanders region))’.84
3.2.3 Border carbon adjustments 
The third and final tool for addressing carbon leakage envisaged by 
the EU ETS Directive is the possibility of introducing border carbon ad-
justments. Article 10(b) paragraph 1(b) of the Directive authorises the 
Commission to propose the ‘inclusion in the Community scheme of im-
porters of products which are produced by the sectors or subsectors de-
termined in accordance with Article 10a’ (sectors exposed to significant 
risk of carbon leakage). The Commission has so far not exercised this au-
thority to propose the introduction of border carbon adjustments into the 
EU ETS. They therefore so far only remain a future option. The most re-
cent consideration of the introduction of a border carbon adjustment was 
made in 2014, when the European Parliament called the Commission to 
‘examine the feasibility of a border carbon adjustment’ for the steel sec-
tor.85 However, the introduction of border carbon adjustments was not 
proposed by the Commission in its EU ETS amendment proposal of 2015.
4 Carbon leakage mitigation under the Commission’s EU ETS amend-
ment proposal of 2015
In July 2015, the Commission issued its proposal for the amend-
ment of the EU ETS Directive. Among some of the biggest changes con-
tained in the proposal is a thorough reform of Article 10(b) entitled ‘Meas-
ures to support certain energy-intensive industries in the event of carbon 
leakage’, which, should the Commission’s proposal be adopted by the 
Parliament and the Council, will be worded as follows: 
83 Case C-266/90 Franc Soba KG v Hauptzollamt Augsburg ECLI:EU:C:1992:36 para 19. 
The judgment in Soba contained a modification of the provisions of a Regulation via an in-
terpretative note. 
84 Marcu and others (n 10) 26.
85 European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2014 on the steel sector in the EU: pro-
tecting workers and industries (2014/2976(RSP)) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bTA%2bP8-TA-2014-0104%2b0%2bDOC%2
bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN> accessed 2 December 2015.
69CYELP 11 [2015] 47-71
1.  Sectors and sub-sectors where the product exceeds 0.2 from  
multiplying their intensity of trade with third countries, defined 
as the ratio between the total value of exports to third countries 
plus the value of imports from third countries and the total mar-
ket size for the European Economic Area (annual turnover  plus  
total imports from third countries), by their emission intensity,  
measured in kgCO2 divided by their gross value added (in €), 
shall be deemed to be at risk of carbon leakage. Such sectors and 
sub-sectors shall be allocated allowances free of charge for the 
period up to 2030 at 100% of the quantity determined in accord-
ance with the measures adopted pursuant to Article 10a. 
2. Sectors and sub-sectors where the product from multiplying 
their intensity of trade with third countries by their emission in-
tensity is above 0.18 may be included in the group referred to in 
paragraph 1, on the basis of a qualitative assessment using the 
following criteria: 
a) the extent to which it is possible for individual installations in 
the sector or sub-sectors concerned to reduce emission levels or 
electricity consumption; 
(b) current and projected market characteristics; 
(c) profit margins as a potential indicator of long-run investment  
or relocation decisions. 
3. Other sectors and sub-sectors are considered to be able to 
pass on more of the cost of allowances in product prices, and 
shall be allocated allowances free of charge for the period up to 
2030 at 30% of the quantity determined in accordance with the 
measures adopted pursuant to Article 10a. …86
The Commission’s EU ETS amendment proposal thereby completely 
changes the method of determining the list of the sectors which are ex-
posed to significant risk of carbon leakage. However, despite the fact that, 
according to the Commission’s estimates, the number of sectors which 
will be considered as exposed to significant risk of carbon leakage will 
be narrowed down from the current 177 to only 50,87 the list will still en-
compass 90% of all industrial emissions (compared to the current 97%).88 
Even though the proposed reform of the identification of sectors which 
are exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage ensures that the car-
86 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-
carbon investments’ COM (2015) 337 final, 2015/148 (COD) 20. 
87 European Parliament, Briefing EU Legislation in Progress, 18 September 2015, Post-2020 
reform of the EU Emissions Trading System 5 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/BRIE/2015/568334/EPRS_BRI(2015)568334_EN.pdf> accessed 3 November 2015).
88 ibid, 5.
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bon intensity of all sectors is always taken into account, and thereby ad-
dresses one of the main drawbacks of the currently applicable methodol-
ogy, it can be seen that it makes little difference in practice due to the fact 
that the threshold values have been set too low. Furthermore, according 
to the above-mentioned Commission’s proposal, sectors exposed to signifi-
cant risk of carbon leakage are scheduled to continue receiving free allow-
ances, albeit on an updated benchmarking system. More regular updates 
of the allowance allocation benchmarks have been proposed with the aim 
of avoiding windfall profits and adjustment to the technological progress 
which has taken place since 2007 and 2008, when the original bench-
mark data were collected.89 Nevertheless, despite the improvements in the 
benchmarking system, it can generally be concluded that the Commission 
has not made use of the opportunity to effectively address the main weak-
nesses of the existing carbon leakage regulation in the European Union. 
5 Conclusion 
The performed analysis of European Union’s carbon leakage mitiga-
tion measures shows that the system leaves ample room for improve-
ment. The current legislative solution contained in the EU ETS Directive 
allows for a sector to be categorised as exposed to a significant risk of 
carbon leakage solely on the basis of its trade exposure and regardless 
of the carbon intensity of that sector. Moreover, the majority of sectors 
have found their way to the current carbon leakage list precisely due to 
the trade exposure criterion. The described legislative solution leads to 
the overprotection of the sectors which are considered to be exposed to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage.90 This issue has been addressed in the 
Commission’s EU ETS amendment proposal of 2015, although the pro-
posed changes are capable of producing a very limited effect in practice. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that this amendment proposal 
might become further strengthened in the legislative process, as has re-
cently occurred with the market stability reserve91 and the extension of 
the EU ETS to the aviation sector.92
89 Commission (n 86) 18.
90 The same conclusion has been reached by Ralf Martin and others, ‘On the Empirical 
Content of Carbon Leakage Criteria in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2014) 105 Eco-
logical Economics 78, 84-85.
91 Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 
2015 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Un-
ion greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC. The 
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Additional strengthening of the European Union’s carbon leakage 
rules is necessary because the current overprotection of sectors which 
are considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage ul-
timately leads to the loss of potential revenue which could be used for 
financing climate change mitigation and adaptation. Climate financing, 
along with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances, 
have represented the most difficult items on the Paris agenda. Should the 
European Union take its financial commitments seriously and meaning-
fully contribute to delivering the USD 100 billion per year pledge which 
was made in December 2015,93 it should strive to mobilise all available 
financial resources for climate financing of developing country mitigation 
and adaptation. This conclusion is further emphasised by recent studies 
which show that the European Union’s current intended nationally de-
termined contribution, which consists of a 40% reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2030 from 1990 levels, ‘falls short of leadership and of 
a fair share’  for which the European Union is responsible.94 
Finally, the fact that current carbon leakage rules in the European 
Union lead to the overprotection of sectors which are considered to be 
exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage has also recently been 
confirmed by several ex-post studies, which found no evidence of a car-
bon leakage risk.95 This factor should be taken into account by the Euro-
pean Union legislator during the upcoming revision of the EU ETS. Even 
though carbon leakage rules are necessary in the current global carbon 
pricing system, they should be better tailored to preserve the environ-
mental and economic integrity of the Union’s climate change legislation 
in a way which does not unnecessarily burden the system and lead to 
the overprotection of certain industries. Such an outcome is crucial for 
the European Union’s climate change action in the global arena, since 
its legitimacy depends on the European Union’s ability to deliver on its 
promises at both the domestic and international level.   
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